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Electoral Conflict
and
Democracy
in Cities

JOHN J. KIRLIN

A s A LITMUS PAPER TEST, electoral conflict should play an important
role in discussions of the extent to which the politics of American
cities are democratic. Although the process by which representa-

tives are elected has long been considered important in national
and state level political analyses, attention to city electoral processes
has been erratic. Electoral conflict played a part, although not often
a central role, in the generation of community power studies, and
city referenda have occasionally been analyzed;' studies of local
elections most often focused upon nonpartisanship.2 Recently, the
1Electoral conflict played a part in the "community" analyses of: Robert
Agger et al., The Rulers and the Ruled (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1964); Gladys M. Kammerer et al., The Urban Political Community (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963); and Aaron Wildavsky, Leadership in a Small
Town (Totowa, N. J.: Bedminster Press, 1964). As examples of local refe-

renda studies, see Harlan Hahn, "Correlates of Public Sentiments About the
War: Local Referenda on the Vietnam War," American Political Science

Review, 64 (December 1970), 1,186-1,198; and Howard D. Hamilton, "Direct,
Legislation: Some Implications of Open Housing Referenda," American Po-

litical Science Review, 64 (March 1970), 124-137.
2 Charles Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections,"
American Political Science Review, 46 (September 1952), 766-776; Adrian,
"A Typology of Nonpartisan Elections," Western Political Quarterly, 12 (June
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comparative city council analyses undertaken in the San Francisco
Bay Area have made local electoral processes a central focus.3
If analysis of city council elections is to prove fruitful, defining
the role of electoral conflict in democratic city politics and finding a

satisfactory measure of electoral conflict are necessary first steps
because considerable confusion and contradiction exist in these

areas. This paper presents a revised interpretation of such conflict
by contrasting an analysis of electoral conflict in Los Angeles suburbs with the work of Prewitt and Eulau on San Francisco Bay
Area cities. While Prewitt and Eulau used the average rate of in-

cumbent defeat as their principal measure of electoral conflict, the
fate of groups of incumbents is analyzed here. This measure is
conceptually more attractive and its use results in conclusions differ-

ing from those suggested by the average rate of incumbent defeat.4
A REFINED MEASURE OF LOCAL ELECTORAL CONFLICT:
THE MULTIPLE DEFEAT OF INCUMBENTS

The nexus between the concept of electoral conflict and the measure using election statistics is critical. If defeat of city council incumbents is averaged over time, each incumbent candidate is
viewed as being re-elected or defeated as an individual, implying
that the election results are independent events. Another possibility

1959), 449-458; Adrian and Oliver Williams, "The Insulation of Local Politics
Under the Nonpartisan Ballot," American Political Science Review, 53 (December 1959), 1,052-1,063; and Eugene Lee, The Politics of Nonpartisanship:
A Study of California City Elections (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1960). For an analysis including nonpartisan political
systems, see Charles Gilbert and Christopher Clague, "Electoral Competition
and Electoral Systems in Large Cities," Journal of Politics, 24 (May 1962),
323-349.

3 Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix and Political Representation; Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem," Ameri-

can Political Science Review, 63 (June 1969), 427-442; Prewitt, "Political
Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability,". American Political
Science Review, 64 (March 1970), 5-17; and Prewitt, The Recruitment of

Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill
Company, 1970).

4Analysts have typically found a high average percentage of incumbents
winning re-election. For example, 80 percent by Prewitt, "Political Ambition";

84 percent by Gilbert and Clague, "Electoral Competition"; and 71 percent by
Lee, Politics of Nonpartisanship.
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exists in many local elections. In elections in which more than one
incumbent is standing for re-election, each incumbent may stand not
individually but rather as part of a group-a group of two or more
incumbent candidates whose futures are linked. Two explanations
of the manner in which this may occur illustrate the argument.
First, coalitional behavior and tendencies to make unanimous de-

cisions would link city council members one to another in behavior
on the council; citizens would then be "correct" in perceiving sameness among the council members and in re-election bids treating

jointly those incumbent candidates who had behaved similarly on
the council. The tendencies to unanimity in decision-making in
small groups are well documented, and when unanimity breaks
down, coalitional behavior is often seen, with two or more councilmen persistently joining in positions on issues brought before the
group. For example, Eulau classified 82 city councils on a conflict
dimension and found: 20 councils with stable coalitions in opposition
to one another (bi-polar split); 29 councils with no stable divisions
(nonpolar splits); and 33 councils in which votes were only very
rarely split (unipolar) .5

Second, electorate linking of two or more incumbent candidates'

re-election bids may rest not on the behavior of the councilmen/
candidates, but upon the behavior of the electorate itself. Accurate
perception of the previous positions (and the campaign positions)
taken by council members demands much of the electorate. Examples of misperception and lack of information are legion; a main

thrust of national-level electoral analysis has been to show how citizens shortcut the cognitive task of distinguishing between candidates, especially by using party labels. Thus, regardless of their
actual differences in behavior as incumbents, two or more candidates may be perceived by the electorate as indistinguishable.
Similarly, voters may vote against the system, or for the system,
using the immediate context of an electoral decision to vent general
feelings concerning their state in life or the operation of the political
system.

In addition to these two explanations for not treating the defeat
of incumbents as independent events, there exists yet another argument which emphasizes the joint defeat of incumbents. If the defeats of incumbents are treated as independent events, an artifact
5"The Informal Organization of Decisional Structures in Small Legislative
Bodies," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13 (August 1969), 341-366.
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of method arises which most analysts would probably reject as

theoretically unjustifiable. The difficulty concerns expectations or
the frequency and pattern in which electoral conflict will appear in
cities. A well-respected hypothesis-perhaps most commonly identified with James S. Coleman-is that political conflict in cities will
be episodic, that is, periods of relative political calm will occasionally be broken by bursts of more intense political conflict, after
which evidence of political conflict subsides.6 Treatment of defeat
of incumbents as an independent event, however, results in the pre-

sumption that political/electoral conflict is randomly observed and
conceals evidence of the sort of episodic, or regime-threatening,
conflict discussed by Coleman and Agger. Analyses focusing upon

the fates of individual incumbents may be appropriate in some instances, but inclusion of a measure of joint outcomes promises to
add new dimension to analyses of city council elections. Application of such a measure to elections of Los Angeles suburbs provides
the context for discussion of the role of electoral conflict in the
political processes of those cities.

ELECTORAL CONFLICT IN Los ANGELES SUBURBS

The cities included in this analysis are general law suburbs within
the Los Angeles-Long Beach Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
(SMSA), with an average population of 30,000 (ranging from
134,584 to 200). These cities encompass 30 percent of the total
SMSA population, and, because this pattern is common to other
metropolitan areas, the politics of such suburbs are the local politics
of a vast number of American citizens. General law cities are incorporated under state statute and have largely identical structures.
Each has a council-manager form of government and a five-man city
council to which councilmen are elected to staggered four-year
terms in nonpartisan, biennial May elections. Thus, two seats are
filled in one election, and three in the subsequent election two years
later. A maximum of 66 cities (out of 78 in Los Angeles county),
is included in the analysis. Election return data for the six biennial elections from 1960 through 1970 were obtained from the
Los Angeles Times. The nongeneral law ("charter") cities ex6 Coleman, Community Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957). See,
also, Kammerer et al., Urban Political Community; and Agger et al., Rulers,
92, 471, 582.
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eluded from this analysis are the larger, older cities of the county;
the smaller cities included here provide a reasonable test of the
role of electoral conflict in the politics of small cities. Indeed,
the conclusions of the analysis may not hold for larger cities, es-

pecially for those with partisan, district elections to city council.
During the period under analysis, incumbent city council candidates in Los Angeles suburbs were re-elected with a frequency of
73 percent. Although this is slightly less than the 80 percent ob-

served in the Bay Area studies, a majority of incumbent candidates
is returned to office by the electorate of Los Angeles suburbs.
Further analysis of these data shows, however, that a greater degree of electoral conflict and electoral accountability exists in

these cities than is suggested by the over-all success of incumbent
candidates.

With what frequency do incumbents stand for re-election? Table
1 reveals that in these Los Angeles suburbs, it is the rare election in
TABLE 1
FREQUENCY OF INCUMBENT RE-ELECTION BIS IN Los ANGELES
SUBURBS, 1960-70

Number of Percentage of
Incumbents Number of Percentage of Incumbents
per Election Elections Elections Re-elected
0

19

5.3

1

79

22.1

2
3

164
96

358

45.8
26.8

79

73
72

100.0

which at least one incumbent does not run and that the usual pattern is two or three incumbents seeking re-election. In 164 of the

elections under analysis, two incumbents were simultaneously candidates for re-election, and in an additional 96 instances, three incumbents simultaneously ran for re-election. These occasions offered the electorate opportunity to reject a sizable minority or majority of the five-member city councils and are the objects of this
analysis.7

Considering each city as a separate political system, 35 of the 66
7For larger councils, more incumbents would presumably run simultaneously
for re-election and analysis would focus on larger groups of incumbents.
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suburbs included in the analysis experienced at least one election
in which two or three incumbent candidates were simultaneously
defeated in re-election bids, as shown in Table 2. While this defeat
occurred in only 43 of 358 elections, the systems implications are
better understood by attention to the fact of council overturn in
over one-half of the cities. This overturn of councils is more frequent than suggested by an average incumbent re-election rate of
73 percent.
TABLE 2
SIMULTANEOUS DEFEAT OF Two OR THREE INCUMBENT CANDIDATES IN SIX
BIENNIAL Los ANGELES SUBURBAN COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1960-70
Frequency of
Council Overturn Number of Cities
Twice
Once
Never

8

27
31

Statistical support for the hypothesis that electorates view mul-

tiple incumbent candidates jointly rather than individually and for
the hypothesis that political conflict is episodic rather than random
is obtained by returning to the election level of analysis and fur-

ther inspection of instances in which two or three incumbents stood
for re-election. In such cases, the expected frequencies of various
combinations of wins and losses can be calculated if the defeat or
victory of each incumbent candidate is assumed to be an independent event (the null hypothesis). Table 3 presents the expected and
observed frequencies of wins and losses of various combinations for
the two and three incumbent cases.8
8 The expected probabilities and frequencies are computed by use of the
formula for determining the probabilities of joint occurrence of independent
events; working out the probabilities for the two-incumbent case illustrates
the procedure. Remembering that the probability of any incumbent being
re-elected for the entire population of ten years' election returns for Los
Angeles suburbs is .73 and that the probability of an incumbent's defeat is then,
of necessity, equal to .27, the various probabilities are:

p(WW) =p(W) Xp(W) =.73X.73=.53

p(W,L) =p(W) Xp(L) =.73X.27=.20
p(L,W) =p(L) Xp(W) =.27X.73=.20
p(L,L) =p(L) Xp(L) =.27X.27=.07

As the two intermediate cases of (W,L) and (L,W) are statistically equivalent,
the probabilities of their occurrences may be added, such that p[(W,L) or

( L,W) ] = .40.
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TABLE 3
FREQUENCIES OF ELECTION RESULTS IN CASES WITH Two OR
THREE INCUMBENT CANDIDATES

Combination Expected Expected Observed
of Election p of Frequency of Frequency of
Results Combination' Combinationa Combination

For

Two

W,W

Incumbents
(N

=

.53

W,L:L,W

164)

L,L

W,W,W

87

.40

.07

12

.39

W,W,L:W,L,W;

66

37

.42

40

96

48
20
42
31

For Three L,W,W

Incumbents W,L,L: L,W,L;
(N

=

96)

L,L,W

L,L,L

a

.15

14

.02

Expected

2

15
8

probabi

cause of rounding errors.

From the evidence in Table 3, it is clear that the most frequent

outcome of elections in which two or three incumbents are candidates is continuation of all in office; that cases of mixed results of
wins and losses are numerous but not as numerous as one would
expect if wins and losses were randomly determined; and that instances in which both or all three incumbent candidates are defeated are relatively rare but more frequent than expected if randomly determined. Thus, the cells in which all incumbents either

win [(W,W) or (W,W,W)] or lose [(L,L) or (L,L,L)] are observed to occur more frequently than expected while the observed

frequencies in the intermediate cases in which incumbent candidates

both win and lose are consistently less than their expected frequencies. Since the expected frequencies were derived from a model
in which the re-election or defeat of any incumbent candidate was

an independent event-a model consistent with the assumptions

Considering Table 3 as a multinominal experiment, a chi-square test shows
the observed frequency of incumbent defeats to differ significantly from the
expected. Over-all, X2=31.94 (d.f.=5), significant at the .001 level. If the
two and three incumbent cases are considered separately, the respective results
are: X2=11.17, d.f.=2, p<.01, and X2=20.77, d.f.=3, p<.001. In both
cases, the greatest contribution to X2 occurs in the difference between observed

and expected cases in which all incumbents are defeated.
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that individual incumbents are viewed singly by the electorate, and
that electoral conflict is distributed randomly over a time periodthe validity of those hypotheses is doubtful. In contrast, the hypothesis that the electorate treats multiple incumbent candidates
jointly and the hypothesis that conflict will be episodic in intensity
are both supported by this evidence.

CONCLUSIONS

Even in a city like Los Angeles, popularly viewed as having a
highly mobile population, political memories of council members

should extend ten years; incumbents do get thrown out of office

with enough frequency to suggest a plausible threat to city councilmen in at least half of these cities. Additionally, of course, communication nets extend beyond the boundaries of any one city, and
news of elections that change or threaten councils should spread to
other council members. Such a conclusion, however, is speculative;
interview data would be needed to test its validity and it should be
remembered that interviews of city councilmen in the Bay Area
studies found them ostensibly unconcerned with the threat of elec-

toral defeat.9 If similar evidence were found in the attitudes of
councilmen of Los Angeles suburbs, the research question would

become the basis of these attitudes, given the reality of some probability of council-threatening behavior by the electorate.
There is evidence here that the electorate did constrain elected

officials by denying continuation in office; that this phenomenon
occurs on a group rather than on an individual basis; and that reliance upon simple averages of incumbent defeats is misleading.
Use of a measure of joint outcomes in analyses of city councils offers
promise of enriched understanding of the role of electoral conflict
in city political systems.

9 Prewitt, "Political Ambition," 7.
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